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I. Introduction
Academics and policy-makers often argue for a harmonized international
system to resolve the failures of large international financial institutions in
order to reduce both systemic risk and the probability that an insolvency of a
major bank will lead to a global economic collapse.' Despite the perceived
2need for international coordination, major obstacles remain. The persistent
failure to achieve any meaningful degree of international cooperation among
regulators and lawmakers to handle failures of global financial institutions
represents a perplexing island of discord in what is otherwise an ocean of
international regulatory harmony. That is, there tends to be abundant
international cooperation in the global financial sector and, ostensibly,
increasing levels of international cooperation in banking regulation is a
fundamental goal of U.S. national policy.3 One scholar recently observed,
"there is extensive international regulatory co-operation in financial services
regulation, co-ordinated through several global regulatory committees."
Moreover, banks in the United States, along with banks in virtually every
other country in the developed world, are regulated by a "global regulatory
1. Charles Hendren, Judicial and Administrative Approaches to Bank Resolution: Prospects
for International Harmonization, (Univ. of Penn., The Wharton Sch., Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No,
11-73), http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/11/plI173.htm:
The financial crisis of 2007-08 brought the world economy to the brink of collapse. If policy-
makers hope to avoid a repeat of these events, they must design and implement enhanced pro-
cedures for resolving systemically important financial institutions. Doing so is challenging
enough at the national level, with the rise of complex financial groups; however, the increased
internationalization of financial activity in recent years presents an even more difficult set of
problems at the global level. Effectively resolving cross-border financial institutions will re-
quire, at a minimum, the harmonization of bank resolution procedures across core countries.
Id. at abstract.
2. Among the remaining obstacles are: (1) adopting effective statutory resolution regimes in
other countries; (2) ensuring systemic global banking firms have sufficient "gone concern" loss-
absorption capacity; (3) completing firm-specific cooperation agreements with foreign regulators that
provide credible assurances to those host-country regulators to forestall disruptive ring-fencing; and (4)
coordinating consistent treatment of cross-border financial contracts. Cross-Border Resolution, Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Nat'! Sec. and Int'l Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Michael S. Gibson, Dir., Div. of Banking Supervision
and Regulation)(transcript available at)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/gibson20130515a.htm
3. See The DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, A New Foundation: Rebuilding Financial
Supervision and Regulation, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/finregfinal06172009.pdf;
see also Edward F. Greene, Dodd-Frank and the Future ofFinancial Regulation, 2 HARv. BuS. L. REV.
ONuNE 79 (2011) ("Given the reality that major financial institutions increasingly conduct significant
portions of their business in many different countries, consistency and cooperation are essential,
especially between the US and the EU."); Allen N. Berger, Qinglei Dai, Steven Ongena, & David C.
Smith, To What Extent Will the Banking Industry be Globalized? A Study ofBank Nationality and Reach
in 20 European Nations, (Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Int'l Fin. Discussion Paper No. 725,
2002), http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2002/725/ifdp725.pdf.
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regime" known as the Basel bank capital standards. Hundreds of countries
have adopted these standards, as well as the numerous regulatory 'guidelines'
promulgated by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) that specify how
regulatory authority over banks is to be divided among various home and host
country authorities. The level of cooperation is such that many countries have
established bilateral agreements in the form of Memoranda of Understanding
that specify how information exchange should be organized. 6 International
agreement, thus, specifies the most important safety and soundness rules, which
concern how much capital a bank must have in order to operate and how the
supervisory authority over financial institutions' cross-border operations is to
be allocated.
Despite all of this and our vast experience with international banks'
failures, reaching agreement on how to resolve the failure of large financial
institutions with significant transnational assets and liabilities has proved
elusive.7 And there does not seem to be much hope for the future: as Federal
Reserve Board Governor Daniel K. Tarullo observed in the wake of the
Financial Crisis, "comprehensive solutions to cross-border crisis management
'will not be easy to achieve.' 8
Oddly, the extant literature on systemic bank failure begins with the
unexamined premise that greater coordination in resolving cross-border bank
failures is an obvious regulatory goal whose costs are outweighed by the
apparently significant benefits of such coordination. Little attention has been
paid to either the descriptive question of why the goal of achieving
international cooperation has been so elusive or to possible strategies to
enhance the probability of achieving greater global cooperation.9
4. Peter Wallison, How Regulators Herded Banks into Trouble, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203833104577069911633739768.html.
5. Cornelia Holthausen & Thomas Rande, Cooperation in International Banking Supervision,
(European Cent. Bank Working Paper No. 316, 2004),
http://ideas.repec.org/p/ecb/ecbwps/20040316.html.
6. See Julia Black, Prudential Regulation of Banks, in 2 INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-
OPERATION: CASE STUDIES, CANADA-US CO-OPERATION, EU ENERGY REGULATION, RISK ASSESSMENT
AND BANKING SUPERVISION 69 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10. 1787/9789264200500-6-en.
7. The fact that we still have new proposals to stop another Lehman reflects the elusiveness of
regulatory cooperation. See BIS Lays Out "Simple" Plan for How to Handle Bank Failures, June 2,
2013, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/02/us-banks-recapitalisation-bis-
idUSBRE9510CO20130602, accessed August 14, 2013.
8. International Cooperation and Financial Regulatory Modernization Before the Subcomm.
on Sec. and Int ' Trade and Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 11 I th Cong.
(2010) (statement of Daniel K. Tarullo, Member, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys.) (transcript
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20100720a.htm)
9. See Rosa Lastra, Cross-border Bank Insolvency, EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT, http://nowandfutures.com/d2/CrossBorderBankInsolvency.pdf, at 7 (assuming the
need for international coordination in resolving cross-border bank insolvencies, pointing out that "[t]he
need for a coordinated liquidation of multinational banks would best be served by the adoption of an
international convention . . . based on ... Universality").
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This Article makes two principal observations. First, as a descriptive
matter, I argue that regardless of the merits of greater global regulatory
harmony in the resolution of failed financial institutions, regulators do not have
the same incentives to harmonize their bank failure resolution procedures that
they have to harmonize in other areas, such as bank capitalization or on-going
supervision of solvent banks to monitor their risk-taking activities.o When
resolving bank failures, both the United States and creditors of failed banks that
settle international transactions in the United States benefit under the current
system. My second observation is that a more promising approach that would
enjoy broad international cooperation would be to, ex ante, rank all the
creditors of failed banks, with highest priority given to particularly deserving
small retail creditors.
The United States, which is winning under the current, balkanized system,
in the sense that it often has control of a disproportionately high percentage of
the assets of failed global financial institutions, has a strong incentive to keep
the ring-fence system of non-cooperation intact, unless moving to a new system
would leave them with control of even more assets. Since the assets and
liabilities of an insolvent financial institution are fixed on the moment of
insolvency, any scheme that resulted in more bank assets being under U.S.
control necessarily would leave fewer assets under the control of non-U.S.
regulatory authorities. In other words, the policy choice between a ring-fence
approach and a coordinated or cooperative approach is zero-sum, and therefore
the fight is about the distribution of assets and power. Under a realist paradigm
(which I adopt), any approach that made the United States better off would not
be acceptable to those countries made worse off under such an approach. The
fact that well-organized, entrenched creditor-groups (including the U.S.
government) benefit from the current system at the expense of widely
dispersed, uncoordinated groups of claimants makes international cooperation
even less likely because the groups with the most political clout and influence
do not favor change antithetical to their economic interests.
By way of illustration, I explore the history of the failure of the global
financial firm the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). It
provides an object lesson in the way that the benefits and costs of the current
system are allocated. In this insolvency, U.S. creditors were paid in full and the
U.S. government collected an "exit fee" of over $200 million in BCCI assets,
while thousands of economically underprivileged depositors both in the United
Kingdom and Southeast Asia received only a fraction of what they were owed.
While netting and settling through continuous linked settlement (CLS) have
10. See Aaron Lucchetti, The Regulator Down the Hall: Fed and Comptroller of Currency
Bolster the Ranks of Staffers 'Embedded' at Nation's Biggest Banks, WALL ST. J., June 20, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304763704576394610591065334 ("[A]s part of
a push to prevent another financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and the Office of the
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mitigated many of the problems related to foreign exchange trading," the core
problem is one of regulatory opportunism, rather than technical problems in
global clearing and settlement. The opportunism problem has not even been
addressed, much less resolved, over the past several decades. Thus, it is not
surprising that international regulatory cooperation has been so elusive.
When arguing that regulators do not have the same incentives to
harmonize their bank failure resolution procedures that they have to harmonize
in other areas, I challenge the assumption that internationally coordinated
cross-border resolutions of bank failures will necessarily be qualitatively better
than the current, rather anarchic state-by-state process that one observes
today.12 Internationally coordinated cross-border resolutions of financial
institutions' failures may sometimes be better than ad hoc country-specific
approaches, from the point of view of basic fairness to creditors. In virtually
every case, some creditors of a failed institution will be better off if the failure
of a particular financial institution was resolved in a coordinated fashion, while
others would be worse off.
Consistent with previous work,13  and following in the tradition of
Anthony Downs, 14 I adopt the a priori assumption that bureaucracies are self-
interested actors. Similarly, following the realist paradigm in international
11. CLS is a group of companies, all of which are subsidiaries of CLS Group Holdings AG.
CLS Group Holdings AG is incorporated in Switzerland and is regulated by the US Federal Reserve as
if it were a bank holding company. CLS Group Holdings AG (CLS) is owned by CLS shareholders,
which include major financial institutions such as AIG and JPMorgan Chase. CLS links central banks
with the world's leading financial institutions in a unique global settlement system. CLS settles payment
instructions relating to FX spot, FX forward, FX swap and over-the-counter (OTC) credit derivatives
transactions. Participants can access the settlement service either directly (as a Settlement Member) or
indirectly (through Settlement Members providing access to third parties). See CLS Keeps the Market
Safe from Settlement Risk ut Needs to Add More Currencies, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 2013,
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21586540-cls-keeps-market-safe-settlement-
risk-needs-add-more; Gabriel Galati, Settlement Risk in Foreign Exchange Markets and CLS Bank, BIS
QUARTERLY REVIEw, Dec. 2002, at 55-66, http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdVr qt02l2f.pdf.
12. Generally speaking, a qualitatively superior bankruptcy regime is one that produces results
more closely aligned with creditors' ex ante expectations as those expectations are informed by
applicable legal rules and contractual agreements. This concept generally is known as creditors'
protection. In other words, a bankruptcy regime is qualitatively better if it generates outcomes more
consistent with creditor's legitimate, i.e. contract-based expectations. A bankruptcy regime is
quantitatively better if it generates the outcome that maximizes the size of the bankrupt entity's estate.
For example, a relevant factor in evaluating the quantitative efficiency of a bankruptcy regime is the
extent to which a particular bankruptcy regime minimizes the transactions costs associated with
effectuating the resolution of the failed firms subject to the bankruptcy process. See Alan Schwartz, A
Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD., 209 (1989); Thomas Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-
Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors'Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook, Is
Corporate Bankruptcy Efficient?, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 411(1990).
13. Jonathan Macey, Regulatory Globalization as a Response to Regulatory Competition, 52
EMORY L.J. 1353 (2003).
14. ANTHONY DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY (1967) (arguing that bureaucrats are rational,
self-interested utility maximizers instead of preference-free altruistic public servants).
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relations theory, I also adopt the a priori assumption that nation-states act self-
interestedly.' 5
In place of the current, top-down conversation which focuses on abstract
ideas of corporate form and corporate governance, the conversation should
revolve around which particular creditors, or classes of creditors, regardless of
their physical location, are most deserving of priority distributions and which
should be relegated towards the rear of the queue. Changing the terms of the
discourse to reflect this important distinction should increase the chances of
attaining a better policy outcome because it would reveal benefits of
international cooperation that have not been appreciated up to this point.
In my proposal to resolve international bank failures, instead of arguing in
the abstract about whether there should be a purely global rather than a purely
local approach to bank failures, I argue that individual nation-states should
adopt a hybrid approach. Under it, local regulators could agree on a case-by-
case basis whether to do what is known as "ring-fence" the assets and liabilities
of a failed bank located in their jurisdictions.' 6 However, in situations in which
local regulators choose to utilize a ring-fence approach to resolving a bank
failure, the local regulators should be required to give priority status to certain
creditors, regardless of where those creditors are located. Specifically, my
approach would favor small, uninsured retail creditors and require that those
creditors receive payment before local creditors. I call this the "particularly
deserving creditor" approach. This would sometimes require local regulators to
participate in global bankruptcies to a limited extent (in contrast to the all-or-
nothing participation required under current approaches to the cross-border
bank failure problem).
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I contains a summary of the
expected costs and benefits of cross-border resolution process, followed by a
discussion of the economic and political forces that explain why, regardless of
the efficiency arguments, achieving a functioning cross-border resolution
system has been arduous. In Part II, I illustrate the shortcomings of a wholly
international, centralized approach to global bank failures. In Part III, I describe
the critical features of my hybrid domestic and international approach that
15. JACK DONNELLY, The Ethics ofRealism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 150 (2008); Richard Russell, American Diplomatic Realism: A Tradition Practised and
Preached by George F. Kennan, 11 DIPLOMACY AND STATECRAFT 159, 159-83.
16. Ring-fencing describes the practice of cordoning off and freezing the assets and liabilities
of a failed company in a particular jurisdiction and then treating these assets and liabilities separately
from the company's assets and liabilities in other jurisdictions. As one commentator has observed, "[t]he
purpose of ring-fencing is to ensure that assets in a particular jurisdiction actually receive special
protection at the expense of others. Essentially the aim is to ensure that local creditors receive
preferential treatment over foreign creditors." Andrew Campbell, Issues in Cross-Border Bank
Insolvency: The European Community Directive on the Reorganization and Winding-Up of Credit
Institutions, http://www.imf.org/extemallnp/leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/campb.pdf; see also T. ASSER, THE
LEGAL ASPECTS OF REGULATORY TREATMENT OF BANKS IN DISTRESS (2001); M. GIOVANOLI & G.
HEINRICH, INTERNATIONAL BANK INSOLVENCIES: A CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE (1999).
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might be politically attainable despite the practical obstacles to international
agreements described in Part I. A conclusion follows.
I. The Reasons for the Island of Discord
A. How Bank Failures Are Resolved
Before expounding upon the reasons for lackluster international
cooperation to resolve the failure of international banks, it is important to
understand the typical resolution process when these institutions fail. The
typical governance response to a failed bank has four components. First,
regulators declare the bank to be insolvent and appoint a receiver to take
control of it.' In the United States, the Federal Deposition Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) is the receiver of failed banks and failed financial
institutions that are deemed systemically important.18
Second, the receiver structures the resolution of the bank, choosing from
options that range from liquidating the bank, to arranging for a merger with
another, more financially sound financial institution, to selling the bank as a
going-concern. The receiver makes fundamental decisions about how to
dispose of the bank's assets and liabilities. For example, the receiver could sell
the assets piecemeal or as a large package and use the proceeds to pay
liabilities. 19 Or the receiver could look for a healthy bank willing both to
purchase the failed bank's assets and to assume the failed bank's liabilities
(thus paying claims in bulk).
Third, the receiver marshals the bank's assets, identifying and collecting
on all items of potential value owned by the bank. In this stage of resolving a
failed bank, the receiver can invalidate the claims of certain creditors, such as
those who have received funds fraudulently from the bank or who have
obtained improper preferential treatment over other creditors. 20 The receiver
also has the power to terminate contracts and leases that impose ongoing
obligations on the bank and to enforce any payment or performance guarantees
that the bank has obtained from third parties. 2 1 The receiver also has the
authority to bring suit against officers and directors of the financial institutions
whose negligence or wrongdoing were factors in causing the bank's failure.22
17. RICHARD CARNELL, JONATHAN MACEY & GEOFFREY MILLER, THE LAW OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 485 (2013).
18. The Dodd-Frank Act, Pub.L. 111-203, H.R. 4173, (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§1821 (c)(4)-(5)) (giving the FDIC the authority to place a failing financial company that has been
designated as a systemically important financial institution ("SIFI") by the Financial Stability Oversight
Council, whether it is a bank, a bank holding company or a non-bank financial company, into
receivership). Other companies are resolved under the Bankruptcy Code.
19. CARNELL ET AL., supra note 18, at 499-500.
20. Id. at 502.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 502.
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Fourth and finally, the FDIC as receiver determines the validity and
priority of claims against the bank and uses the proceeds from the bank's assets
to pay the claims that the FDIC deems valid. If those claims exceed the value of
bank's assets, as they typically do, the receiver pays creditors in the order of
priority prescribed by law (paying deposits first, then ordinary non-deposit
claims, then subordinated debt last).23
Local regulators only exercise jurisdiction over the financial institutions
chartered within their country. Regulators, however, can grab the assets of
failed financial institutions over which they have jurisdiction. Where there are
multiple resolution processes occurring simultaneously--or where there is a
perceived risk that there may be other resolutions processes in the future-
regulators often opportunistically grab the local assets of failed financial
institutions. These assets will then be available to satisfy the claims of local
creditors, and, of course, to satisfy any claims the government might have in
the way of uncollected fines, penalties or taxes.
In short, any decisions to coordinate the resolution of a failed financial
institution are made on a case-by-case basis by regulators. Regulatory
authorities have discretion in this regard. Any decisions to cooperate are
voluntary.
B. Cross-Border Resolutions: The Economics of the Politics
As I have pointed out in a previous paper, notwithstanding the enormous
complexity of the problem, regulators desire to achieve agreement on how to
supervise banks' balance sheets because, in the absence of such an agreement,
local regulators would lose both power over the financial institutions they were
supposed to regulate as well as their ability to exercise their traditional
regulatory authority over banks' capital levels. Regulators were threatened with
losing power and autonomy because large financial institutions with significant
cross-border operations could render any local capital regulations irrelevant
simply by conducting operations through subsidiaries or other corporate
affiliates located in jurisdictions with less stringent capital requirements. Even
financial institutions without subsidiaries in jurisdictions with more relaxed
capital standards could simply establish subsidiaries or affiliates in such
jurisdictions.
In other words, regulators have strong incentives to agree to common
international rules for capital levels because without such agreement they risk
losing much of their ability to regulate at all. Thus, while regulators might
prefer to have complete regulatory autonomy, cooperation with other regulators
is preferable to having their regulatory power usurped.
23. Id. at 485.
702
Vol. 31, 2014
On the Enduring Attraction of the Ring-Fence Approach
Regulators do not have the same incentives to reach agreement in the field
of bank failure resolution, however. Creditors of financial institutions, by
definition, are not aware that the financial institutions to which they have lent
their money will fail someday. This is axiomatically true, because if the
creditors thought that their financial institutions would fail, then they
immediately would eliminate this risk by withdrawing their money. In simple
terms, because creditors of failed depository institutions are unaware of their
status as future creditors of failed depository institutions, they are unable to
galvanize into an effective political coalition to push for efficient ex ante rules
prior to a bank failure. On the other hand, after a financial institution has failed,
its uninsured creditors are strongly motivated to exert whatever political or
legal pressure they can on regulators to motivate them to use whatever
discretion they have to resolve the failed financial institution in the way that
will maximize their recovery. For U.S. creditors, this often means that they will
exert pressure on regulators to ring-fence the assets and liabilities of the failed
institution.
Thus, as I have observed previously, under certain conditions it is far
more likely to achieve unified global regulatory solutions than under other
conditions. In particular, global regulatory coordination is more likely to
emerge when one of the following three conditions is met: (1) when regulatory
globalization permits regulators to achieve "regulatory cartelization" by
eliminating jurisdictional competition among regulators; (2) "when
governmental actors or regulators can increase their power by persuading or
forcing other countries to adopt regulations favored by the first country" (I
label this "regulatory imperialism"); or (3) when global coordination or
cooperation can be used as a "regulatory policy lever," which happens when
"an administrative agency lacks domestic political support for a favored policy"
and uses regulatory globalization to make it more difficult for local political
rivals to block that policy24 Under these conditions, regulators have strong
incentives to engage in efforts to achieve regulatory globalization.
Examining cross-border bank failures from this perspective, it is easy to
see why there has been such a lack of coordination in resolving global bank
failures. Simply put, although in other contexts, particularly in the context of
achieving global cooperation in setting capital levels for banks, these
conditions may exist, they are sorely lacking for any attempt to create a global
resolution scheme for bank failures.
The first condition under which we would expect to achieve global
regulatory cooperation is when such cooperation allows regulators to achieve
"regulatory cartelization" by eliminating jurisdictional competition among
regulators. But in the context of bank failure resolution, bank regulators would
lose market power rather than gain it by cooperating with other regulators.
24. Id. at 353-54.
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Regulators have incentives to cooperate when they can increase their authority
by doing so. Regulators tend not to cooperate when it reduces their power and
autonomy. For example, when global foreign exchange markets become so
large and competitive that the central banks of mid-to-large-size economies,
like France or Germany, cannot steer monetary policy because they no longer
have the market power necessary to affect the prices of sovereign debt, then
they have incentives to cooperate with other central banks to create a regulatory
cartel. This explains the emergence of the European Central Bank. The bank is
more powerful than the central banks of any individual E.U. member state,
which allows local regulators to influence the interest rates in their own
countries by lobbying the Central Bank in Frankfurt. While a second-best
solution, this cooperation is better for regulators than trying to act individually
as they did in the past. In contrast, however, regulators continue to enjoy
autonomy and power in the domain of resolving failed financial institutions. As
such, regulators would likely lose power rather than gain it by agreeing to
resolve failed financial institutions on a global rather than local level.
Second, for the same reason, when it comes to the issue of resolving
failures of international financial institutions, regulators are unlikely to be able
to increase their power by persuading or compelling other countries to adopt
regulations favored by the first country. "Regulatory imperialism," then, is not
an avenue to international cooperation in this space. This is because, unlike in
certain other areas such as the regulation of banks' capital levels, the financial
institutions regulated by a particular local regulator have no incentives to
relocate to other jurisdictions to take advantage of what they might deem to be
superior regulation. This is because, by definition, the equity claimants of failed
financial institutions generally lose their equity interests when these institutions
fail. And, to the extent that shareholders have a chance of retaining an
economic interest in a reorganized financial institution or in profiting from the
sale of an economically troubled financial institution, these shareholders are
likely to fare much better if their financial institution is resolved by local
regulators-who may be influenced and even captured by the shareholders of
the failed institutions-than by distant regulators over whom they are unlikely
to have much influence.
Third and finally, while it is the case that global coordination or
cooperation can be used as a "regulatory policy lever" by regulators who lack
domestic political support for a favored policy, this strategy only works where
regulators in one country can claim that there is such a strong international
consensus in favor of the regulations they prefer that the country risks being
ostracized unless the groups at home accede to new rules. In other words,
sometimes regulators can use regulatory globalization to make it more difficult
for local political rivals to block that policy. The negotiations over the Basel
capital accords provide a good example of this phenomenon. Regulators from
Japan, who wanted to impose stricter capital requirements on failed banks but
did not have the domestic support to do so, were able to achieve the enactment
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of such stricter capital requirements by asserting that if Japan failed to agree to
these requirements, it risked becoming subject to the sanctions that likely
would be imposed upon financial institutions in regimes that did not adopt the
relatively strict accords.25 In contrast, cooperating on a global basis to
homogenize the rules concerning bank failure will not enable any particular
regime to leverage its local authority, which, of course, already extends to
resolving failed financial institutions.
In a nutshell, then, we tend to observe regulatory cooperation when
interest groups and regulators benefit from such cooperation. We tend to
observe an absence of it when it would reduce the power of interest groups and
regulators. As it happens, the resolution of cross-border financial institutions
falls into the latter category. The beneficiaries are the particular sub-set of
creditors who would benefit more from a coordinated, cross-border approach to
bankruptcy, but this set of creditors is an amorphous and unidentified (indeed
unidentifiable) group that has no prospect of galvanizing into an effective
political coalition to press for change.
C. Cross-Border Resolutions: Qui Bono
Two unexamined assumptions about the cross-border resolution of failed
banks permeate much thinking on the subject. The first assumption is that
international coordination for resolving failed banks on a world-wide basis is
the desired policy outcome; that is, one that always is preferred to the
alternative of ring-fencing the assets and liabilities of insolvent financial
institutions and allowing each jurisdiction affected by the failure to resolve
such failures individually. The ring-fence approach to resolving failed banks is
thought to display poor international citizenship and to generate generally
unspecified 'bad' policy outcomes. For example, the Financial Stability Board,
which includes among its members the IMF, World Bank, Board of Governors
of the U.S. Federal Reserve System, and the Banks of Canada, China, England,
France, Italy, and Russia2 6 has proclaimed that "any financial institution that
could be systemically significant or critical if it fails should be subject to a
resolution regime that [makes them] the subject of institution-specific cross-
border cooperation agreements."27 The international consensus is that "the
statutory mandate of a resolution authority should empower and strongly
encourage the authority wherever possible to act to achieve a cooperative
solution with foreign resolution authorities." 28 Similarly, "cross-border
cooperation agreements should help facilitate institution-specific crisis
25. Id. at 1372-75.
26. http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm.
27. Financial Stability Board, Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial
Institutions, (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.htm; see
also Michael S. Gibson, supra note 2.
28. Financial Stability Board, supra note 27 at 15.
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management planning and cooperation between relevant authorities, with a
presumption in favor of cooperation in the event of the firm's resolution."29
A second unexamined assumption embraced by commentators and
regulators is that the historic and ongoing lack of meaningful cross-border
cooperation in the case of bank failures is due to failures of diplomacy or to
cultural misunderstandings that prevent countries from reaching agreement.
The point here is that those who say that we should have cross-border
cooperation because such cooperation would lead to better outcomes fail to
explain why we cannot seem to achieve this outcome. In other words, it simply
is assumed that international coordination is desirable (the first assumption),
and that some unspecified failure of regulatory diplomatic zeal is all that stands
in the way of achieving a regulatory regime based on such international
coordination (the second assumption).
But I think it is misguided to speak in such absolutes. Sometimes a
country-by-country approach will be better than a coordinated approach where
"better" is defined as capturing a larger pool of assets for distribution to the
claimants of a particular failed institution before they can be dissipated by the
bank. It is also clear that certain claimants to the assets of a financial institution
will be better off with a jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach than with a
global, borderless approach. The BCCI bankruptcy is an object lesson in how a
jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction approach benefits the creditors in some countries at
the expense of others.
My second point is that the chronic inability of the international
community to reach agreement to require cross-border resolutions of failed
financial institutions, while not conclusive, does at least suggest that the
benefits from reaching such an agreement are not significantly greater than the
costs. From a simple bargaining perspective, the international community's
persistent inability to reach agreement to coordinate cross-border bank failures
suggests that such agreements are expected to generate relatively small benefits
in relation to the benefits currently realized under the status quo. This is
because if the benefits were orders of magnitude greater than the costs, then
whatever frictions are preventing states from reaching a binding consensus
would be overcome because the gains to the winners would be sufficiently
greater than the losses to the losers that the winners could compensate the
losers for their losses and still be better off than they would have been under
the status quo. In other words, if an internationally coordinated resolution
system were actually more efficient than the current jurisdiction-by-jurisdiction
approach, it would be likely that an international resolution scheme could be
achieved quite easily. Here, I mean efficient in the Pareto sense of making
some creditors better off without making others worse off.30
29. Id. at 23 (emphasis added).
30. See Mikhael Shor, Pareto Optimal, http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/
urlof entry.html> (last visited Sept. 13, 2013).
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A Coasian analysis leads to the prediction that if the total amount
recovered for creditors and other claimants in insolvency was expected to be
highest in a borderless coordinated resolution, parties would bargain to achieve
this result. Following this line of thought, here I claim that the failure to
cooperate is due primarily to the fact that there not a significant amount to be
gained from a comprehensive international regulatory framework on bank
failures. To understand why, I now discuss the primary goal of the bankruptcy
resolution process-fairness-and how a without-exception international
approach to it will not generally accomplish this goal.
D. The Primary Goal of Bankruptcy Resolution Processes: Fairness
While bankruptcy laws differ among nations in important respects, a
general goal of bankruptcy policy is to achieve an orderly resolution of a failed
economic enterprise and to deter the "race for assets" 31 among creditors in
order to promote "equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors." 32
Since, by definition, a bankrupt financial institution does not have sufficient
assets to meet the demands of all legally entitled or eligible claimants to those
assets, some mechanism for allocating what assets remain should exist. A
properly functioning failure resolution mechanism for financial institutions
should not favor the strong or politically connected over the weak. Similarly,
the mechanism should not favor claimants who are sophisticated or possess
inside information because this would be unfair.
The "race for assets" is shorthand for the prisoner's dilemma that faces the
creditors of insolvent companies.33 Despite the fact that all creditors when
viewed in the aggregate would benefit by shepherding the assets of the public
company so as to maximize their value, individual creditors can benefit
themselves at the expense of the collective by rushing in to plunder particular
assets as compensation for their claim against the debtor. Those who strike
31. Morris Macey, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978, 28 EMORY L.J. 685, 685 (1979). Another goal of bankruptcy law, at least under the reorganization
provisions in Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is to give debtors a "fresh start" in business after
reorganizing their businesses and re-setting the terms of their obligations to creditors. U.S. bankruptcy
law has been criticized as being too lenient on companies. Other countries, particularly France, France's
insolvency process also has been criticized as being tilted too much towards companies and jobs, and
affording too little influence to the creditors of failed companies. In Britain, insolvency usually results in
liquidation. Despite these differences, all countries share the public policy goal of efficiently resolving
the debtor's estate. European Bankruptcy Laws: Out of Pocket, THE ECONoMIST (Dec. 30, 2008),
http://www.economist.com/node/12855376; Michelle White, The Costs of Corporate Bankruptcy: A
U.S.-European Comparison, in JAGDEEP BHANDARI AND LAWRENCE WEISS, CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY
467 (1996).
32. Id.
33. The prisoner's dilemma is the name for the collective action problem that faces groups of
people who must make decisions simultaneously but without being able to observe the decisions made
by the other people in the group. The point of the prisoner's dilemma is to demonstrate the fact that in
group decision-making a conflict sometimes exists between the decision that is best for the individual
and the decision that is best for the group. Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among
Egoists, 75 AM. POL. SC. REV. 75, 306-318 (1981).
707
Yale Journal on Regulation
earliest to grab at the assets of a troubled company, financial or otherwise, are
rewarded with a disproportionately large share of the debtor's estate. Those
who lag behind will receive only what is leftover, which is often nothing. Most
troubling is that many of those who lag behind have legal entitlements to the
assets that are superior to, or at the same priority as, the creditors who rushed
into grab assets.
This prisoner's dilemma creates incentives for this "me-first" behavior
that tends to lead to a premature rush among creditors for the assets of a
bankrupt estate. In the banking context these incentives lead to bank runs as
depositors, swap counterparties and other creditors rush to eliminate their credit
exposure to the firm and to remove their cash and reallocate it to lower risk
repositories. In fact, the pressure to move quickly can even lead to runs on
banks that are solvent because it is less risky and far cheaper for depositors and
other creditors to remove their money from banks that are even rumored to be
in financial difficulty, much less financial distress.
On the other hand-and this is a critical point of this Article and one that
is not fully appreciated by participants in the current debate-while creditors
have strong incentives to move too quickly in response to rumors, the same is
not true for regulators. Au contraire, regulators have strong bureaucratic
incentives to move too slowly. This may impose severe costs on the economies
in which failed banks operate for several reasons, the most important of which
is that the losses experienced by failed banks inevitably mushroom as such
banks' assets dwindle in proportion to their liabilities, but regulators, loathe to
suffer the political fallout associated with bank failures and bailouts, inevitably
will fiddle while banks' assets burn. Often, as we saw in the most recent crisis,
the fire may become too big to control and too costly to contain.
One insight of this Article is that the incentives for regulators to move too
slowly will be exacerbated as the power to shut banks down becomes more
centralized. As such, consolidating the resolution process for failed financial
institutions, in my view, will not necessarily deter the "race for assets" among
creditors that would otherwise occur under the piecemeal collection rules of
local jurisdictions, and it likely will make such a race even worse. Regulators
may move even more slowly under a consolidated approach to international
insolvency, as they will no longer face any pressure to close firms quickly to
avoid having assets transferred to different jurisdictions in which the failed
bank may have solvent affiliates. A centralized failure resolution process
effectuated through cross-border agreements among bank regulators will also
not deter individual creditors from racing to grab assets in anticipation of a
problem with a bank.
Recognizing the threat posed by the race to assets, especially to uninsured
or unsophisticated creditors that lag behind, most countries' bankruptcy laws
have an explicit fairness objective. This is often expressed as the goal of
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promoting "equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors." 34 It is
unclear whether more international cooperation would make the resolution of
vast multi-national financial institutions fairer because no amount regulatory
coordination can alter the fact that international financial institutions are
remarkably complex.35 There are economic reasons for this complexity, such as
tax avoidance, regulatory arbitrage, and asset partitioning.
Commentators in favor of a more international and less parochial
approach to resolving bank failures can point to a number of extremely high
profile events that demonstrate the manifest unfairness that have resulted from
resolving bank failures on an individual basis. I believe that the bankruptcies of
Lehman Brothers and BCCI are two of many such examples.
1. Lehman Brothers
When Lehman Brothers failed, it was a "truly global firm with over 7,000
legal entities in more than 40 countries." Lehman's insolvency "resulted in over
75 separate and distinct bankruptcy proceedings," 37 reflecting the scope of
Lehman's operations as well as the large number of distinct legal entities
operating under the Lehman umbrella.38
Lehman's non-U.S. entities that filed for bankruptcy along with Lehman
could have filed petitions in U.S. courts under the framework provided by
Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code ("the Code"), whereby a debtor may to file
a plenary proceeding in one jurisdiction and seek recognition from United
States' courts.39 Lehman's non-U.S. entities, however, pursued an alternative
strategy. Hoping to avoid the liquidation of its broker-dealer units, as
contemplated by Chapter 7 of the Code, Lehman filed under Chapter 11 for
only its holding company. This kept its broker-dealer subsidiary out of
bankruptcy until it had time to move all of the customer accounts.40
It is important to note, that, as one might expect, the crucial maneuvering
occurred before Lehman's formal bankruptcy filing. Mere hours before the
34. See RICHARD F. DUNCAN, WILLIAM H. LYONS & CATHERINE LEE WILSON, THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS: WORKING WITH ARTICLE 9 §§ 8.04[2], 8-13, (describing
"equality of distribution among similarly situated creditors" as the primary purpose of the bankruptcy
rules regulating preferential transfers).
35. RICHARD HERRING & JACOPO CARMASSI, The Corporate Structure of International
Financial Conglomerates: Complexity and Its Implications for Safety and Soundness, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF BANKING (2009).
36. See Table 1, infra.
37. Press Release, Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., Lehman Group of Companies Signs Cross-




39. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1532 (2006).
40. David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Boundary Games, 4 BROOKLYN J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.
1, 12 (2009).
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company declared bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, as Lehman Brothers
sank deeper into insolvency, some of its employees transferred approximately
$8 billion in funds from its London brokerage affiliate to accounts that the firm
held in New York.41 This "transfer left Lehman's London affiliate with
essentially no funds; there weren't even sufficient resources to pay
employees."4 2 In addition, hedge funds and other institutional investors,
including U.S. clients of the London subsidiary, were stranded with financial
claims on a corporate entity devoid of assets.43
While Lehman Brothers was operating at full steam, its London subsidiary
made billions of dollars in securities and derivatives trades on behalf of hedge
fund clients around the world. Many of these clients preferred to clear their
trades in London rather than in New York due to London's relatively lenient
rules for buying securities on margin. These rules allowed Lehman's clients to
borrow more money to finance their trades in London than they could in New
York.4 Lehman had vast amounts of funds in London to support these
operations. Lehman's bankruptcy illustrates just how quickly such assets can be
repatriated to the United States when trouble starts.
Lehman's bankruptcy provided a modem-day example of the ring-fence
approach. And, in this important natural experiment, it does not appear that
ring-fencing prevented the efficient resolution of the failed firm's assets. Of
course, whether the assets were distributed equitably remains unanswered and
rather doubtful.
In addition to the transfer of funds from the United Kingdom to the United
States, it turns out that there was significant ring-fencing of Lehman's Asian
assets.45 Joseph Yam, the CEO of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority
(HKMA), testified before a legislative committee of the Hong Kong
Legislature established to examine certain aspects of Lehman's collapse. The
committee was particularly interested in the reportedly heavy losses on Lehman
46structured credit instruments experienced by small, retail investors. Mr. Yam
testified that the ring-fencing was done in order "to maintain stability of the
city's banking system and protect the interests of Hong Kong investors." 47 The
HKMA identified nineteen international banks with subsidiaries in Hong Kong,
41. Christine Cumming & Robert Eisenbeis, Resolving Troubled Systemically Important
Cross-Border Financial Institutions: Is a New Corporate Organizational Form Required? FEDERAL




44. Left in Limbo-or Worse-by Lehman, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG (Oct. 1, 2008),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2008/10/01/left-in-limbo-or-worse-by-lehman/? r-0.
45. Georgina Lee, HKMA Ring-fenced Assets Before Lehman Collapse, RISK.NET FINANCIAL
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put the subsidiary companies on an "intensive monitoring" list, and then ring-
fenced their Hong Kong assets in order to make sure that these assets could not
48be repatriated to their home countries by their non-Hong Kong parents.
Despite the evidence of self-interested ring-fencing in both Europe and
Asia, the Lehman bankruptcy, notwithstanding the extent to which it disrupted
global markets and unsettled the short-term credit markets, is viewed as
something of a success. 49 Lehman quickly sold its North American investment
banking business to Barclays and its European, Middle Eastern, and Asian
operations to Nomura, the large Japanese investment bank.50
2. BCCI
The collapse of the mega-bank BCCI provides an even more egregious
example of unfairness than Lehman Brothers' unpaid employees, whose pay
packets presumably went into the pockets of such unworthy American creditors
as swaps counterparties. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York had inside
information regarding when BCCI would be shuttered by foreign regulators.5 1
This information was used to the benefit the U.S. creditors and to the detriment
52of foreign creditors, particularly in Japan and the United Kingdom. For
example, as Hal Scott has observed, the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ), a
major Japanese financial institution, entered into a foreign exchange transaction
in which it was exchanging Yen for American dollars. The payout of Yen
occurred in Tokyo, while the second leg of the transaction was to occur several
hours later because the New York money markets were not yet open after the
first leg of the transaction. Unfortunately for 1BJ, BCCI was closed on July 5,
1991, after the Tokyo leg of the transaction, but before the New York leg of the
transaction had settled. This meant that the IBJ's counterparty received the Yen
it had purchased, but that IBJ was relegated to the position of an unsecured
creditor of BCCI for the dollars it had planned to receive in exchange for its
delivery of the Yen in the foreign exchange payment.
48. Id.
49. Kenneth Ayotte & David Skeel. Bankruptcy or Bailouts? 35 J. CORP. L. 470, 481 (2010)
("[T]he [Lehman] bankruptcy process has been remarkably effective in many respects.").
50. Id. at 481-482.
51. Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics and International
Operations to Examine Allegations ofDrug Trafficking and Money Laundering in the US. by the Bank
of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI), Focusing on Foreign Policy Implications, 102d Cong.,
l' Sess. (1991) (testimony of J. Virgil Mattingly, Jr., General Counsel and William Taylor, Staff
Director, respectively, of the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Testimony on BCCI Drug Trafficking and Money
Laundering].
52. Id.
53. Hal Scott, Supervision ofInternational Banking Post-BCCI, 8 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 487, 500
(1992). An agency of a bank is simply an office in a foreign country that does business on behalf of its
parent bank like issuing international letters of credit and making loans on behalf of their parent.
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BCCI had a very modest presence in the United States. It had no U.S.
depositors because it had no American branches. Its direct corporate presence
in the United States was limited to two uninsured state-licensed "agencies," one
in New York and the other in Los Angeles. 5 4 These agencies were not allowed
to accept deposits from U.S. citizens or U.S. residents and had minimal assets
and liabilities.
Largely as a result of actions by the New York Fed that prevented banks
involved in clearing and settling the U.S. legs of trades in which BCCI was a
counter party, when BCCI was shuttered the bank itself had $550 million in
assets in the United States." Only a small fraction of this amount consisted of
assets of BCCI's New York and Los Angeles agencies. 56 The bulk of the $550
million was attributable to two sources. First, at the behest of the Fed, banks
clearing foreign currency transactions for BCCI accepted payments made to
BCCI but did not make payments from BCCI to its counterparties. Second,
BCCI was alleged to be the beneficial owner of several U.S. banks, including
First American Bank.s First American was solvent, and was determined not to
have been harmed financially by the insolvency of BCCI-its major,
clandestine shareholder.59
BCCI's $550 million in assets stood in sharp contrast to the bank's
liabilities, which were less than $20 million to non-BCCI entities.60 Thus, while
BCCI's liabilities far exceeded its assets on a global basis, the opposite was
true in the United States as a result of the U.S. government's strategy of
authorizing payments to BCCI but not from BCCI. Not only were all of BCCI's
U.S. creditors paid in full, but before any of the $550 million in the bank's
assets were returned to the parallel liquidation proceeding in London, the
Federal Reserve Board levied a $200 million fine against BCCI for using
middlemen and failing to disclose its identity when it made certain investments
in the United States, particularly the acquisition of First American.6 1
Ultimately, $275 million of BCCI's assets went to pay fines to U.S.
regulators, to pay U.S. creditors, and to bolster the capital position of the U.S.
banks that BCCI was said to own illegally.6 2 In stark contrast, BCCI in the
54. Id. at 501.
55. BCCI failed because of massive self-dealing by bank insiders, including significant loans
to shareholders who used the bank's stock as collateral. In addition the bank was essentially a criminal
enterprise that engaged in money laundering and other financial crimes on a global scale. On July 5,
1991 customs and bank regulators in seven countries raided the bank and closed its operations. JOSEPH J.
TRENTO, PRELUDE TO TERROR: EDWIN P. WILSON AND THE LEGACY OF AMERICA'S PRIVATE
INTELLIGENCE NETWORK 370 (Carroll & Graf eds., 2005).
56. Id. at 502.
57. Testimony on BCCI Drug Trafficking and Money Laundering, supra note 52.
58. Michael Quinn, Figuring BCCI's Effect on First American Bank, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1991, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/22/business/figuring-bcci-s-effect-on-first-american-bank.html.
59. Id.
60. Scott, supra note 54, at 502.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 503.
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United Kingdom had 6,500 retail depositors, many of whom were immigrants
from India, Bangladesh and Pakistan.63 After the imposition of American fines
and the payouts to U.S. creditors, many of these depositors faced significant
financial hardship as a result of BCCI's collapse, as did many small borrowers
whose funds were frozen when BCCI's London operations where closed down.
After years of waiting, most BCCI depositors eventually got some
compensation. For example, clients with less than £20,000 in their accounts
received 75% of their deposit's value.
Because of time zone difference, there is extremely limited overlap
between the trading day in the United States and the trading days in other
financial centers such as Frankfurt, Tokyo, and Hong Kong.&6 New York has
only 1.5 hours of overlap with the Frankfurt trading day, and there is no overlap
between the trading New York trading day and the trading days in Hong Kong
and Tokyo. In every trade where the first leg settles abroad, U.S. authorities
have ample opportunity to act opportunistically, as they did in BCCI, by
impeding payments in settlement of trades by insolvent banks while permitting
collections in settlement of such trades. Whenever this is done, the United
States and U.S. creditors can profit from a sort of time zone arbitrage.
II. The Limits of an International Response
Lehman and BCCI appear at first blush to provide an object lesson in the
virtue of international bankruptcy proceedings and the unfairness of ring-
fencing, a distinctly local approach. But such a conclusion would be premature
for three reasons, each of which will be considered in the following three
subsections.
A. The Problem ofFraudulent Conveyances
First, it is wrong to assume that a consolidated international bankruptcy
process could actually solve the fairness issues. It is undeniable that ring-
fencing, which is what is done now when institutions fail, generates unfair
results in certain cases, with Lehman and BCCI being two cases in point. But it
is far from clear that an alternative system would generate different results.
This is because the unfairness to, say, small retail depositors or employees
in the Lehman and the BCCI bankruptcies were not generated by the piecemeal
administration of the bankrupt estates of these firms. The actions taken here
were, of course, accomplished prior to the closure (BCCI) or bankruptcy filings
(Lehman) of the affected firms. As such, the fairness problems just described
emanated from transfers that occurred prior to bankruptcy, namely preferential
63. Mary Hennock, BCCI's Painful Legacy for UK Asians, BBC NEWS (Jan. 14, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hii/business/3392703.stm.
64. See infra Table 2.
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transfers and fraudulent conveyances. In light of this fact, international
agreements about how to resolve distressed, failing and failed financial
institutions will not resolve the fairness problem as it is actually experienced,
for those problems occur before international regulators would actually begin to
manage an insolvency.
The fairness problems identified here would best be solved by having
local tribunals, exercising their discretionary (i.e. equity-like) power to avoid
particular transactions, which may derive from either an express statutory grant
of authority or from common law. The judicial powers required to achieve
fairness in bankruptcy, regardless of whether or not the bankrupt firm is a
financial institution, are the power of equitable subordination and the power
to avoid preferential transfers and fraudulent conveyances.66 It is easy to see
that these rules are intended to promote fairness and prevent results like
Lehman and BCCI. However, it is far from clear how international coordination
of bank resolutions would make much if any difference in the application of
these rules. The core problem, which manifests itself in several ways, is that
fairness cannot be achieved merely by means of either mandating enhanced
coordination among authorities or even by delegating authority and control
over the global wind-up or liquidation of a distressed or bankrupt financial
institution to a single regulator or a single jurisdiction. This is because control
over a bankrupt financial institution is meaningless without concomitant
control over the creditors of such financial institutions.
1. Local Regulator's Creditor Control Problem
Control over the creditors is essential because the problem of unfairness
arises when creditors prematurely grab portions of a bankrupt financial
institution's assets. Local power that can claw these assets back into the
bankrupt's estate, wherever that estate is being administered, inevitably is
required in order to achieve the fair resolution of an insolvent financial
institution.
Among the many obstacles to achieving local control over creditors of
failed banks at an international level that have heretofore gone unrecognized
are the following. First, generally speaking, clawing back the assets of an
insolvent bank requires that some regulator make hard choices about which
creditors of failed banks get to keep the assets that have been transferred to
65. Equitable Subordination is the power to reclassify creditors' claims from high priority
status to lower priority status in order to achieve an equitable result. See Legal Info. Inst., Definition of
Equitable Subordination, CORNELL L. SCHOOL,
http://www.law.cornell.edulwex/equitable_subordination.
66. The goal of rules against fraudulent conveyances is to prevent insolvent debtors from
making transfers that "hinder, delay, or defraud their creditors." Douglas Baird & Thomas Jackson,
Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985) (discussing the
Statute of 13 Elizabeth).
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them and which do not. Inevitably, these decisions require determinations of
which creditors have acted in good faith, which creditors' contractual claims
should be respected, and whether the applicable local norms of corporate
behavior within corporations and among parents and subsidiaries have been
respected. In other words, no failed financial institution can be resolved without
picking and choosing among creditors.
Second, for reasons explained below, in virtually every case, the creditors
from whom funds must be clawed back in order to effectuate a coordinated
resolution of failed bank assets are actually sovereign governments or
governmental institutions. It is implausible that sovereign nations will
voluntarily relinquish their own sovereignty to the extent necessary to allow a
foreign regulator access to assets they have obtained from failed banks through
regulatory action.
Finally failed financial institutions that might be subject to international
regulatory cooperation are organized into vast and complex corporate
structures. It is axiomatic that the failure of one juridical entity within a
corporate group does not necessarily or automatically imply the failure of other
entities within the group. Liquidations and reorganizations are done only to
insolvent firms. Fairness can only be achieved in cross-border bankruptcy to
the extent that payments among the solvent and insolvent companies within a
financial conglomerate can be unwound.
2. The Problem of Picking and Choosing among Creditors
An international resolution process will also lead regulators to unfairly
pick and choose among creditors. To understand the deep nature of this
problem, it is necessary to understand the nature of the shadow banking system
and to understand the problem of bank runs that still plagues the shadow
banking system. Before the development of modern financial markets,
depositors and creditors in bank runs withdrew their deposits or demanded
payment of other extensions of credit to the financial institution. Bank runs
over time have become electronic, as customers can move their money by
tapping a few buttons on a keypad or touchscreen. Such fast electronic runs
happen to various types of financial institutions that borrow and lend in the so-
called shadow banking system.
The shadow banking system consists of the large, informal electronic
markets in which various types of short-term financial credit not guaranteed by
any government's deposit insurance scheme are traded. This sector of the
financial markets is gigantic, and the financial participants generally are
considered "too big to fail." As such, it appears that the giant financial
institutions that participate in the shadow banking system have lower costs of
67. See Table 1 infra.
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funding because lenders are confident that the creditors of these institutions
will be bailed out if the institutions themselves should fail. This unfairly
penalizes smaller creditors who do not participate in the shadow banking
system as well as smaller financial institutions that do not have access to the
shadow banking system because they are not too big to fail.
Swap transactions, repurchase (repo) agreements, and sales of commercial
paper dominate the shadow financing system. In a repurchase transaction, for
example one firm sells securities to another along with a simultaneous promise
to repurchase the securities from the buyer shortly thereafter, often the very
next day. Repo transactions thus are in substance short-term loans for the seller
of the securities, with the securities "sold" serving as collateral, and the loan
repayment occurring when the seller of the securities repurchases them.
Significantly, the repurchases of securities involved in repo transactions are
made with, and depend upon, the seller-repurchaser being able to "roll-over" or
immediately to effectuate a subsequent repo in order to obtain the funds
required to repurchase the securities sold in the prior repo.
A run will occur in the shadow banking system anytime a seller of
securities in the system is unable to roll over its outstanding repos or
commercial paper issuances or swaps Bankruptcy laws in the U.S. prevent
these transactions from being unwound as a fraudulent conveyance,68 for good
reason. Unwinding these transactions would freeze capital markets and prevent
financial institutions from obtaining the funding they need to operate. In
general, securities transactions and transactions in the shadow banking system
are protected from the trustee's avoidance powers in bankruptcy in order to
protect the financial markets from the disruption and possible collapse that
would occur if securities transactions and settlement payments made in
connection with securities transactions could be set aside and clawed back in
bankruptcy.69
While the legal rules that protect such transactions are subject to abuse
and manipulation by creditors and companies that disguise payments as
"securities transactions" in order to avoid having such payments set aside, the
fact remains that international agreements are not going to upset these rules
68. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 78, 101(53A), 109(d); 362, 741-753; 761-767; §§ 781-784; see also
In re Slatkin, 525 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing exemption of margin and settlement payments
from preference and certain fraudulent transfer powers normally applicable in bankruptcy); In re Stewart
Finance Co., 367 B.R. 909 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that the term "stockbroker" should be
broadly construed-at least for Section 546(e) purposes-and finding the entity in question to be a
"stockbroker"); In re Nat'l Gas Distrib., LLC, 369 B.R. 884 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007) (evaluating
whether a natural gas contract was a "swap agreement"); Calyon NY Branch v. Am. Home Mortgage
Corp., 379 B.R. 503 (Bankr. D. Del. 2008); Am. Home Mortgage Inv. Corp. v. Lehman Bros. Inc., No.
07-11047, 2008 WL 2156323 (Bankr. D. Del. May 23, 2008).
69. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Quebecor World (USA) Inc. v. Am. United
Life Insur. Co., 2013 WL 2460726 (2d Cir. 2013); Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa (In re Enron
Creditors Recovery Corp.), 651 F.3d 329, 334 (2d Cir. 2011).
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because the stability of national and global financial markets depend on them,
which is evidenced by the size of the shadow banking system.
The system has about $15 trillion in assets, which makes it even larger
than the traditional banking system. 70 When combined with similar problems
that plague the derivatives markets, as one observer trenchantly has observed,
"[ilt now seems that the 21st century will resemble the 19th and early 20th
centuries, with periodic panics and runs on financial institutions, perhaps
followed by deflationary collapses."71 In the Euro Zone, these problems have
plagued banks and entire countries, like Greece and Portugal. The "country as
bank" is a new and not entirely reassuring catch phrase, showing that the
problem goes beyond the private sector."72
In sum, unwinding transactions in the modem banking system would not
merely require surrendering regulatory turf over the insolvent financial
institutions in a particular jurisdiction. It would also require local jurisdictions
to surrender their authority over all of the creditors in a cooperating economy.
And the problem does not end here. Government policy and practice
appropriately connects bankruptcy rules and even exceptions to bankruptcy
rules, and these rules and exceptions are critical to the very survival of
domestic capital markets. It is highly unlikely that a sovereign such as the
United States would agree to abdicate its authority to protect such transactions,
even if such abdication is required to facilitate an international bank failure
resolution scheme.
B. Governments Have Their Own Interests at Stake in Controlling Bank
Insolvencies
Finally, for reasons explained below, in virtually every case, the creditors
from whom funds must be clawed back in order to effectuate a coordinated
resolution of failed bank assets are actually sovereign governments or
governmental institutions. It is implausible that countries will permit a foreign
regulator access to assets they have obtained from failed banks through
regulatory action.
Governments do not want to relinquish power to foreign regulators
because they have a strong interest in protecting whatever funds that local
surviving financial institutions have managed to finagle from the coffers of
insolvent institutions. This is because the primary concern of central banks
during a financial crisis is that a "global imbalance" in capital flow will bring a
70. Zoltan Pozsar, Tobias Adrian, Adam Ashcraft, & Hayley Boesky, Shadow Banking,
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Staff Report No. 458, July 2010,
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/staffreports/sr458.pdf.
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particular economy to its knees.73 As we saw both in the Financial Crisis and in
BCCI, global flows of capital strongly favor the United States and serve as a
"stabilizing ... source," unlike in other countries where net outflows of capital
create instability.74 These global inflows of capital reduce the need for direct
government support of financial institutions during crises. The implication here
is that, at least for the United States, agreeing to cooperate in a global
bankruptcy resolution process would expose the government's balance sheet to
significantly greater obligations in the form of bailout dollars than otherwise
would be required. In other words, the likely costs to U.S. taxpayers of
agreeing to cooperate in an international resolution of global financial could
prove enormous.
BCCI provides a cogent example of the extent to which the government
cooperation required to resolve the failure of a cross-border financial institution
likely will be viewed more as capitulation than cooperation. Recall that the
U.S. government imposed a fine of over $200 million against BCCI and that it
took those millions from BCCI before allowing the funds to be added to the
BCCI's global bankruptcy estate. It seems implausible that the United States, or
any other sovereign, would permit another government to determine when it
could collect a fine for alleged financial peccadillos that occurred within its
borders.
The ring-fencing utilized both in BCCI and Lehman is a strong indication
that the United States is not interested in cooperating. It also indicates at least
one way in which the United States is the beneficiary of the status quo, ad hoc,
country-by-country resolution process. As Table 2 shows, a small number of
countries, led by the United States, and including the United Kingdom and
Japan, dominate the world market in stock exchange transactions, and this
dominance is growing. The United States also dominates foreign exchange
trading, since the dollar remains the primary reserve currency. As a result, at
least one leg of most foreign exchange transactions occurs in the United States.
As the travails of the IBJ in the BCCI insolvency illustrates, when
settlements occur in the United States the opportunity to benefit U.S. creditors
at the expense of non-U.S. creditors emerges, particularly when international
coordination exists. After all, the New York Fed was only able to freeze
payouts by BCCI counter-parties because of international cooperation, for it
was informed of BCCI's insolvency by regulators in other jurisdictions. This
information alerted the authorities to the fact that they could benefit U.S.
interests by allowing the banks that were settling BCCI's foreign exchange
trades to receive funds from non-U.S. debtors of BCCI, but forbidding these
banks to transmit funds due to non-U.S. creditors of BCCI. In other words, in
one of the most important international financial institution insolvencies in
73. Ricardo J. Caballero, The "Other" Imbalance and the Financial Crisis (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15636, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5636.
74. Id. at 2.
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history, international cooperation enabled the U.S. authorities to effectuate a
palpably unfair distribution of the failed institution's assets.
A further obstacle to international cooperation is caused by the explicit
and implicit guarantees that the United States and other governments provide to
creditors of systemically important financial institutions. Both the Federal
Reserve and the European Central Bank responded to the Financial Crisis by
making medium-term loans of large sums of money to local banks at very low
rates of interest. These governments, of course, have begun to request that these
loans be repaid. They are unlikely to accede to any agreement that affects their
ability to be repaid for such loans.
C. The Organization ofInternational Financial Institutions as an Obstacle to
International Resolutions
Moreover, it is tautologically true that the failed financial institutions that
might be subject to international regulatory cooperation are organized into vast
and complex corporate structures. The problem is that the failure of one or
more juridical entities within a corporate group does not necessarily or
automatically imply the failure of other entities within the group. Solvent
organizations within a global financial conglomerate are not liquidated or
reorganized when one or more companies with whom such solvent
organizations share a common owner fail. Unless the international community
agreed to disregard the corporate forms of affiliates (such as subsidiaries and
parent companies) of insolvent financial institutions, then the assets of solvent
subsidiaries and parents of failed financial institutions cannot be liquidated or
transferred to satisfy creditors' claims in a cross-border insolvency proceeding,
regardless of the level of cooperation on the part of the governments in which
such affiliates are located.
III. A Feasible Alternative Approach to Both Ring-Fencing and Total
Consolidation
As noted above,75 where ring-fencing is allowed, branches and, as in
BCCI, other affiliates such as agencies and subsidiaries of foreign banks, will
be treated as separate legal entities and will be wound-up as such. Interestingly,
then, the very existence of ring-fencing provides strong evidence that banking
regulators are not indifferent about which particular bank creditors are favored
in an insolvency. This, in turn, indicates that the FDIC, the agency that by law
serves as receiver in every failed bank, has preferences about which creditors
should, at the margin, be paid over others. An obvious example is insured
75. See Campbell, supra note 17.
76. The FDIC serves as receiver for all failed national banks and national thrift institutions. 12
U.S.C. § 1821(c)(2)(A)(ii) (2012). See also CARNELL, MACEY & MILLER, supra note 18, at 492.
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depositors, as distinct from uninsured depositors. The FDIC, in its capacity as
insurer, prefers that assets be used to pay insured depositors, who tend to be
local, to uninsured depositors, who are more likely to be foreign creditors of a
failed global financial institution.-
The practice of ring fencing is generally criticized and viewed an example
of poor global citizenship. Moreover, ring fencing is inconsistent with best
practices in international law. Specifically, Article 13(1) of the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL")77 prohibits ring-
fencing, stipulating that: "foreign creditors have the same rights regarding the
opening of, and participation in, a proceeding under [identify laws of the
enacting State relating to insolvency] as creditors in this State."
As developed in Part I of this Article, it is hardly surprising that, while the
United States has adopted certain sections of this Model Law, it has not
adopted Article 13. And the United States is unlikely to change its position, at
least as long as domestic law continues to reflect the preferences of U.S.
regulators and the creditors. The ability and willingness of the United States to
act aggressively to freeze the assets and to ignore the off-shore liabilities of
insolvent cross-border financial institutions suggests that the ring-fence
approach strongly favors U.S. interests. As such, it is plausible that the homage
paid by U.S. politicians and regulators to the virtues of international regulatory
cooperation may be mere lip-service.78
A. Obstacles to Ring-Fencing
While this Article focuses on the public-choice rationales for the United
States' stolid embrace of ring-fencing, I fully recognize that there are also
obstacles to ring-fencing., such as the complexity of cross-border financial
institutions, the lack of honest or competent regulators in certain foreign nation-
states that might attempt to assert jurisdiction over a particular failed
institution, and substantive difference among the insolvency laws of different
states. While these problems are formidable, they all are surmountable, as
evidenced by the ability of multiple jurisdictions to harmonize their capital
rules, notwithstanding the fact that these same obstacles also existed there.
For example, if foreign regulators are corrupt or biased in favor of certain
creditors on the basis of inappropriate criteria such as kinship or cronyism, then
regulators in other jurisdictions would be justified in taking the position that
77. UNCITRAL is a subsidiary body of the United Nations General Assembly. It prepares
legislative texts for use by States in modernizing commercial law.
78. See, e.g., Barack Obama, Promoting International Regulatory Cooperation, Jan. 5, 2012
Executive Order 13609, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/01/executive-order-
promoting-international-regulatory-cooperation; Kathleen Casey, Commissioner, U.S. Sec. & Exchange
Comm., The Role of International Regulatory Cooperation and Coordination in Promoting Efficient
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repatriating the assets of a failed financial institution would result in such assets
being pilfered or squandered.
While foreign corruption or bias might lead to concerns on the part of
U.S. regulators about cooperating in a global bankruptcy by repatriating a
failed bank's assets to a foreign jurisdiction, regulators in other jurisdictions
would be justified in having concerns about the costs and inefficiencies in the
U.S. system, where legal fees and jurisdictional competition among judges for
large cases leads to waste, and even, as at least one scholar has argued,
corruption." In the United States it "often takes years to resolve individual
cases. As a result of such delays, much of the operating value of businesses can
be destroyed., 80 Such delays are attributable to the fact that the bankers and
lawyers, whose financial analyses, motions practice, deposition scheduling, and
other tactics can influence significantly the speed of a bankruptcy proceeding,
have private incentives to keep the bankruptcy proceedings going until the
debtor's assets are fully depleted and these professionals no longer can be paid.
Interestingly, however, in the United States, unlike in other countries,
bank insolvencies are generally not administered in bankruptcy courts or other
judicial forums. 8 Rather, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
serves simultaneously as both the receiver and the primary creditor of failed
institutions. As such, the egregious inefficiencies that characterize the
bankruptcy process in general likely do not characterize the resolution process
for failed banks. Interestingly, in the wake of the Financial Crisis, the creditors
of important non-bank financial institutions such as hedge funds, private equity
firms, insurance companies and investment banks were exempted from the
bloated bankruptcy process that non-financial firms and smaller financial firms
endured.82
79. See LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2006).
80. Michael C. Jensen, Corporate Control and the Politics of Finance, 4 J. OF APPLIED CORP.
FIN. 13, 29 (1991); see also Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, The Determinants of Professional
Fees in Large Bankruptcy Organization Cases, 1 J. OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111 (2004); Lynn M.
LoPucki & Sarah D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York:
Empirical Evidence ofa 'Race to the Bottom, 54 VAND. L. REv. 231 (2001).
81. In the United States, Congress has conferred to the Federal Deposit Insurance Company
(FDIC) "virtually complete responsibility for resolving failed federally insured depository institutions"
and Congress also has entrusted the FDIC with "expansive powers to ensure the efficiency of the
process. In exercising this significant authority, the FDIC is required by statute to maximize the return
on the assets of the failed bank or thrift and to minimize any loss to the insurance funds." RESOLUTIONS
HANDBOOK, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 70 (2003),
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch7recvr.pdf.
82. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act provides the
FDIC with the "exclusive authority" to resolve "covered financial institutions," in a manner that is
"substantially similar to the FDIC's resolution process for depository institutions." [Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), 12 U.S.C. §§
5381(a)(8), 5383(b) (2012). A covered financial institution is by defined by Dodd-Frank as any non-
bank financial institutions whose failure and resolution under bankruptcy would pose systemic risk. Id.
at § 5383(b). Thus, under the FDIC Act and Title II of Dodd-Frank, both federally insured depository
721
Yale Journal on Regulation
The fact that it is highly unlikely that the goal of achieving a plenary
global regulatory structure for resolving failed banks will be achieved in the
foreseeable future does not mean that progress cannot be made on a smaller
scale. In fact, the potential problems of corruption, cronyism and inefficiency
identified here (in addition to the fairness concerns I raised earlier) indicate that
a plenary global regulatory structure may not even be desirable,
notwithstanding the near-universal rhetoric in favor of it.
B. The Most Deserving Creditor Proposal
What I propose focuses on classes of creditors of failed financial
institutions rather than on geography. My approach builds on the simple
premise that some creditors, regardless of where they are located, deserve our
sympathy more than others. Small retail depositors are particularly sympathetic
creditors. I surmise that a there would be broad support for a policy proposal
that gave priority access to the claims of small, uninsured individual retail
creditors, regardless of where those assets happen to be located.
Reverting yet again to the BCCI insolvency, the "underprivileged
creditor" approach suggested here might have had more chance of success in
repatriating BCCI assets located in the United States to the global insolvency
proceeding than vague appeals to the virtues of international cooperation and.
On the one hand, it is plausible that BCCI might have deserved to be fined by
the U.S. government for filing false statements with U.S. regulators. On the
other hand, it is not plausible that the U.S. government deserved the $250
million it received in the insolvency more than the struggling East Indian and
Pakistani shopkeepers who lost their lives' savings when BCCI was declared
insolvent.
The approach advocated in this Article would not require the United
States or any other country to abandon a ring-fence approach in resolving an
insolvent financial institution. Rather, I envision each of the various
jurisdictions involved in resolving a failed bank agreeing to make good faith
sacrifices in order to generate fairer, more equitable outcomes in the cross-
border failure resolution process. Specifically, my approach would allow any
jurisdiction involved in the resolution process for a failed global financial
institution to identify any "particularly deserving creditors" in their
jurisdictions to the regulators in the other jurisdictions involved in the
resolution process. While it would be highly desirable to reach an international
accord that defines ex ante what a "particularly deserving creditor" is, such an
accord is not a necessary precondition to the implementation of my proposal.
Rather, the approach that I envision would empower the receiver appointed to
marshal and distribute the assets of a failed financial institution in a particular
institutions and non-bank financial institutions whose failure and resolution under bankruptcy would
pose systemic risk must be resolved and administered by the FDIC rather than the courts. Id.
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jurisdiction to also file a claim in any parallel, ring-fenced bankruptcy
proceeding in another jurisdiction for extraordinary relief. The claim would
allow individual jurisdictions to determine for themselves what classes of
creditors should be designated as "particularly deserving"
I fully recognize that the term "particularly deserving creditor" may be so
nebulous such that its definition and scope could be easily debated. Defining
the term likely would be the subject of intense controversy among the nation-
states involved in international insolvencies. It is for this reason that the
solution I propose is based on an incremental, common law approach. The
approach does not require countries to sacrifice sovereignty over either banks
or creditors.
Rather, than appealing to the better natures of the decision-makers
involved in the restructurings of collapsed financial firms, my approach relies
exclusively on the "court of public opinion" as its enforcement mechanism. The
realist paradigm embraced in this Article, assumes that nation-states and their
leaders are motivated by self-interest. But bureaucrats' and politicians' self-
interest is affected in important ways by public opinion. It is in the self-interest
of bureaucrats and politicians to be perceived as "doing the right thing" and as
not caving into powerful special interest groups. In other words, rationally self-
interested political actors will care about public opinion, not always, but at least
sometimes. On the one hand, there is no question that policy choices frequently
are so abstract, obscure or technologically complex that public opinion matters
little, if at all. But sometimes a particular policy issue will crystallize in the
public's imagination because it is both salient and comprehensible. When this
happens, public opinion becomes a key cause of social policy generosity.83 As
noted above, this is not because policy-makers are altruistic; it is because they
are self-interested. Particularly relevant to this analysis is the fact that public
opinion has acted as a brake on policy makers' inclination to push for social
84policy retrenchment. This is not because policymakers are anything other than
self-interested. It is because they are self-interested. Their self-interest,
however, sometimes motivates them to be altruistic, such as when they believe
that appearing altruistic is the preferred political survival strategy. Here my
point is that by reframing the issue into one of elemental fairness rather than
one of national interest, it might be possible to change the incentives facing
policy makers such that they determine that ring-fencing no longer becomes the
political-support maximizing strategy.
Policy attitudes are open to different perceptions of reality." This
hypothesis is consistent with studies showing that concrete policy attitudes are
83. CLEM BROOKS & JEFF MANZA, WHY WELFARE STATES PERSIST: THE IMPORTANCE OF
PUBLIC OPINION IN DEMOCRACIES7-11 (2007); Clem Brooks & Jeff Manza, Social Policy
Responsiveness in Developed Democracies, 71 AM. Soc. REV. 474 (2006).
84. Id.
85. Christian Larsen, The Institutional Logic of Welfare Attitudes: How Welfare Regimes
Influence Public Support, 41 COMP. POL. STUD. 145-148 (2007).
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highly dependent on the framing of political issues." By framing the issue on
the basis of which individual creditors or classes of creditors are most
deserving, rather than on the basis of which nation-state should gave the
authority over the various creditors' claims on the assets of a failed financial
institution, policy attitudes are more likely to be shaped in a way that is
sympathetic to outcomes that are broadly viewed as more equitable.
Significantly, in Coughlin's seminal cross-national study of
deservingness, the ranking of deserving groups was consistent in every country
analyzed. Specifically, the public favored the elderly above all other groups,
followed by the sick and disabled, need families with children and the
unemployed. More generally, groups most likely to be designated as
particularly deserving creditors in the court of public opinion will be those who
can demonstrate that their problems are beyond their immediate control." One
academic, Christain Larsen, presents the following hierarchy of deservingness:
(a) Control - those who lack control of their situation, with the lower the
degree of control the higher the degree of deservingness;
(b) Need - those with the greatest need will be considered most deserving;
(c) Identity - The more that citizens are able to identify and feels a sense
of group belonging with a group, the more deserving such citizens will consider
that group to be;
(d) A grateful attitude-the more grateful, and, apparently, the more
docile and compliant a group appears to be, the more deserving it will appear;
(e) A proclivity for reciprocity - the greater the past or expected future
payback, the more deserving a group will appear.89
Analysis of these factors in the context of the BCCI insolvency provides
grounds for cautious optimism.90 An estimated 1.3 million depositors around
86. Id; see also 0. Kangas, Self-Interest and the Common Good: The Impact of Norms, Self-
ishness and Context in Social Policy Opinions, 26 J. SOC. ECON. 475, 475 (1997); W.A. Gamson and A.
Modigliani, The Changing Culture ofAffirmative Action, in 3 RESEARCH IN POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY 137-
138 (Richard G. Braungart ed., 1987).
87. RICHARD COUGHLIN, IDEOLOGY, PUBLIC OPINION AND WELFARE POLICY (1980); see also
W. Arts & W. Van Oorschot, The Social Capital of European Welfare States: The Crowding Out
Hypothesis Revisited, 15 J. EUR. SOC. POL'Y 5, 5-26 (2005).
88. Jeffry A. Will, The Dimensions of Poverty: Public Perceptions of the Deserving Poor, 22
Soc. SCI. REs. 312, 329 (1993); see also Bernard Weiner, Danny Osborne, & Udo Rudolph, An
Attributional Analysis of Reactions to Poverty: The Political Ideology of the Giver and the Perceived
Morality of the Receiver, 15 PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. REv. 199, 199 (2011).
89. Larsen, supra note 87, at 149; W. Van Oorschot, Who Should Get What, and Why? On
Deservingness Criteria and the Conditionality of Solidarity Among the Public, 28 POL'Y & POL. 33, 34-
37 (2000).
90. The same cannot be said for the Lehman bankruptcy, unfortunately. It appears that "the
most aggrieved" of Lehman's trading partners was Bank of America, who was owed a reported $500
million, which it posted as collateral to support derivative transactions between itself and the respective
Lehman entities. Other major creditors were major hedge funds, hardly the sort of claimants likely to
evoke widespread public sympathy. Matthew Goldstein, Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy Gets Ugly,
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the world stood to lose their savings when BCCI, which had seventy branches
around the world, collapsed.91 Many depositors who were ultimately not
compensated, or compensated after years of distress, have both less control and
more need than creditors who received more value for their claims. This is
because some depositors, such as insiders, are better at monitoring the solvency
of a bank than other depositors. These depositors may also negotiate to obtain
compensation for greater levels of perceived risk, and can access a wide range
of banks as potential sources in which to allocate their cash. Less sophisticated
depositors-the losers in BCCI and Lehman-cannot monitor or access funds
on a nationwide or worldwide basis. It is more likely that such depositors will
be deemed to lack control when a bank collapses and these depositors are too
slow to try to grab them. To most populations, these creditors will likely be
considered deserving for lack of control and depth in need to the extent that
such depositors have small claims and that such claims constitute a large
percentage of their overall assets.
The third factor, identity, is more ambiguous. The largest identifiable
group that may have qualified as deserving creditors under this criterion were
the owners and employees of small Asian businesses, each of whom lost
thousands of pounds when BCCI closed down.92 Small Pakistani businesses
and their employees and owners were among the most numerous of BCCI's
U.K. depositors. This stands to reason because BCCI was founded by a
Pakistani entrepreneur and became what has been described as: the bank of
choice for members of the Asian community, who were outsiders, often
shunned by traditional British banks. But at B.C.C.I. they found a welcome,
people who looked like they did, spoke their language and understood their
problems. To walk into a B.C.C.I. branch was to enter a comfortable world of
93shared cultural assumptions and business norms.
While the Asian population in the United States has been growing, by
2000 only 4.21% of the U.S. population was Asian, and of this group only
.06% was Pakistani, and 0.58% was Asian-Indian. 94 If the lack of a sense of
familiarity with a given group causes citizens to feel that members of said
group are less deserving, then this group of most deserving creditors (under the
control and need criteria) might have less success under the identity criterion.
Some support for this perspective emerges from the history of the BCCI
resolution. For example, the Sultan Waboos of Oman ordered a royal grant of
91. Ruler to Fully Compensate BCCI Depositors in Oman, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWS
ARCHIVE (Feb. 16, 1992), http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1992/Ruler-To-Fully-Compensate-BCCI-
Depositors-In-Oman/id-40b6eld2b639220b20f2b02416932bc1.
92. Britain's Biggest Banking Scandal, BBC NEWS (Jan. 13, 2004),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3383461.stm.
93. STEVE LOHR, The Bitter Victims of B.C.C.I.'s Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1991,
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/29/business/the-bitter-victims-of-bcci-s-fall.html.
94. TERRANCE REEVES & CLAUDETTE BENNETT, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS, We the
People: Asians in the United States, at 1, (Dec. 2004), http://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/censr-
17.pdf
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several millions rials95 to compensate the roughly 7,000 Omani investors. 96 In
doing this, Oman enabled all of the Omani depositors in BCCI to receive 100
percent repayment of their depositors, rather than the "20 or 30 percent
received by depositors in some other countries."97
On the other hand, countries in general, and the U.S. in particular are
becoming more diverse. As such, people's exposure to other religious, cultural,
and ethnic groups is increasing, and is likely to bring with it greater
identification and empathy. This, of course provides a basis for optimism, albeit
guarded optimism, that the framework offered here today may have generated
positive results for the poor, unsophisticated creditors of BCCI abroad.
The penultimate criterion, grateful attitude, appears indeterminate. It is not
clear how a group would express their gratitude for being compensated by
another company in an international bank failure.
The final criterion, a proclivity for reciprocity, does not auger in favor of
the likelihood that poor, financially unsophisticated depositors will be
embraced as particularly deserving. Economically poor creditors are unlikely to
repay their benefactors. However, it also is clear that social welfare benefits
would rarely be extended to anybody if the ability to reciprocate were a
prerequisite. Because degree of need is one of the main criteria, it stands to
reason that those who are most deserving under the need criterion will be the
ones least likely to be in a position to reciprocate.
Thus, using BCCI as a natural experiment in the application of the
approach advocated here, there is strong evidence that appeals made on behalf
of deserving creditors could be successftl. This argument becomes stronger in
light of the fact that, unlike most appeals for social welfare wealth transfers, the
money to fund the transfers under my approach would not come out of
taxpayers' pockets. Rather the source of the funds would be the assets of the
failed institution wherever such assets can be found. The cost of these transfers
would not be born directly by the government or the taxpayers, but other, more
sophisticated creditors of the failed institutions who would receive lower
distributions.
C. Counter-Arguments and Moral Hazard
I will now address four possible arguments against my proposal. Though I
do not claim that this represents an exhaustive list of all critics' possible
objections, I believe the three criticisms rebutted here are the most probable.
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1. Lack of Precedent
One objection to this proposal is that under existing U.S. bankruptcy law,
there is no formal designation or specific legal status accorded to "particularly
deserving creditors." Instead, creditors are supposed to receive in a liquidation
or reorganization of a bankrupt firm precisely what they are entitled to receive
under state law and contract. Secured creditors, for example, have priority
status over unsecured creditors, notwithstanding the fact that secured creditors
often are sophisticated, deep-pocketed lenders. As such, one might argue that it
is inconsistent to provide protection to "particularly deserving creditors" in
international insolvencies but not to provide such protection in domestic
insolvencies.
The flaw with this objection is that while creditors in the United States are
not generally protected because they are "particularly deserving," there remain,
in part for other reasons, special protections under U.S. law for such creditors.
For example, up to $250,000 of the claims of creditors of failed U.S. banks
whose status as creditors derives from the fact that they are depositors in such
banks, are protected by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company Act.98 The
non-bank institutions that are subject to resolution by the FDIC are too-big-to
fail, and even the most undeserving creditors of those financial institutions
generally receive payment of the debts they are owed (though the shareholders
typically are not similarly protected). 99 One way of implementing the
"particularly deserving creditors" proposal advanced here would be for the
United States to accord priority status to all uninsured creditors (such as the
depositors in BCCI) of failed cross-border financial institutions whose claims
are less than $250,000. Assets would be reallocated to the jurisdiction with
such relatively small claim creditors on a priority basis.
2. Windfall for Governments?
Further, with respect to my proposal, I do not endorse extending priority
status to creditors of failed banks whose claims may be satisfied by a deposit
insurance regime or any sort of bailout by a given jurisdiction. Government
rescues and insurance schemes put the government in the shoes of the creditors
who are insured or bailed out, making them the real parties-in-interest in such
98. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides deposit insurance
guaranteeing the safety of a depositor's accounts in member banks up to $250,000 for each deposit
ownership category in each insured bank. As of September 30, 2012, the FDIC insured deposits at 7,181
institutions. Fed. Deposit Ins. Co., Statistics at a Glance,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/statistical/stats/2012mar/fdic.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
99. The concept of "too big to fail" implies, among other things, that creditors of large
financial institutions "are protected by an implicit government guarantee against failure," which means
that insolvent institutions that are too big to fail will be resolved in such a way that, like Bear Stearns
and others, the claimants on the liability side of their balance sheets will receive payment on the debts
they are owed.
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cases and not their depositors. Governments, unlike depositors, are not
"particularly deserving creditors," because they display none of the
characteristics of lack of control, need, identity, grateful attitude or proclivity
for reciprocity that justifies designation as a particularly deserving creditor.
Moreover, government-to-government assistance, including assistance to
governments paying the claims of depositors of failed banks, is not an
appropriate use of funds in bank insolvency proceeding. Rather, such
government-to-government payments are instruments and expressions of
foreign policy and are properly left in the purview of the diplomatic corps.
3. The Problem of Moral Hazard
A third potential concern with my approach is moral hazard. Banking
regulators could, conceivably, allow domestic banks to take greater risks than
they would do otherwise, to the extent that the regulators foresaw that some
portion of potential losses generated by such excessively risky activities might
be shouldered by more responsible jurisdictions who might succumb to appeals
by the creditors of failed banks chartered in less responsible jurisdictions.
Similarly, one might even imagine that bank regulators would reduce deposit
insurance protection available to depositors to the extent that they believed that
help from abroad might be available to satisfy some or all of the claims of
uninsured depositors.
These concerns are remote for three reasons. First, the prospect of being
designated a particularly deserving creditor is remote. Second, even if a
particular creditor or class of creditors received such a designation, it is highly
unlikely that a foreign government or consortium of foreign governments
would have the financial wherewithal or the political will to repay such
creditors the principal and interest owed to them in full. Third, because
payments under the framework I am proposing are voluntary, and result from
appeals to political motivations of the regulators in wealthier jurisdictions,
regulators faced with appeals from receivers and regulators in cross-border
insolvency proceedings could and should take into account the role of the local
regulators and the local regulatory regime as causal factors in the crisis.
Similarly, I would not accord priority status to the creditors of government-
owned depository institutions such as those that dominate the financial
landscape in China.
4. The Scope of the Proposal
Finally, I recognize that these limitations on my proposal make the
proposal subject to the criticism that it is so narrow that it is unlikely ever to be
applied. There are two responses to this. First, the failures of BCCI and
Lehman provide real-world examples of situations in which my "particularly
deserving creditor" approach would be applied. As noted above, the BCCI
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creditors who were unpaid were recent immigrants to the U.K., many of these
people were in economically marginal if not struggling conditions. In Lehman,
the inequity of favoring the U.S. creditors was not as obvious, but there is
certainly no basis for the notion that the U.S. creditors were more deserving
than their European counterparts. And treating similarly situated creditors
differently simply on the grounds that they are situated in a more powerful
jurisdiction is not fair.
Second, the fact that my proposal would rarely be applied is not really a
criticism of my proposal. If it turns out that there really are few if any cross-
border bankruptcies in which "particularly deserving creditors" exist, then it
must be the case that there is just not much need in eliminating the ring-fence
approach to international insolvency.
IV. Conclusion
This Article explains why ring-fencing has not been completely replaced
by a coordinated international response. I have argued that an international
approach would be contrary to the United States' interests because it would
reduce the power of U.S. regulators and disadvantage U.S. creditors.
The mere fact that the United States and U.S. creditors generally benefit
from the ring-fencing approach does not necessarily mean that this approach is
undesirable normatively. In fact, the opposite may be true. Regulators may
move even more slowly under a consolidated approach to international
insolvency, as they will no longer face any pressure to close firms quickly to
avoid having assets transferred to other jurisdictions. In short, consolidating the
resolution process for failed financial institutions, in my view, will not
necessarily deter the "race for assets" among creditors that would otherwise
occur under the piecemeal collection rules of local jurisdictions, and it likely
will make such a race even worse. Moreover, a centralized failure resolution
process effectuated through cross-border agreements among bank regulators
will not deter individual creditors from racing to grab assets ahead of a possible
problem in a bank.
The spectacular inequity of BCCI and Lehman provides a useful
indication of who the losers and winners in international, multiple-jurisdiction
bank failures are likely to be. U.S. creditors, particularly the U.S. government,
boot-strapped itself into creditor status by imposing a massive fine on BCCI
before repatriating the bank's assets to the global insolvency proceeding-a
proceeding that the U.S. had opportunistically exempted itself from.
Put another way, the phenomenon of Herstatt risk is not limited to the risk
that a bank or other global financial institution will fail before completing both
legs of a foreign exchange or other cross-border transaction. Rather, Herstatt
risk also includes the risk that when such a financial institution fails, regulators
will either refuse to repatriate assets to a global, coordinated bankruptcy
proceeding or respond to the financial institution's failure by declining to
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permit the payment of the second leg of an uncompleted trade to increase the
assets in that jurisdiction for payouts to domestic creditors.
Finally, in this Article I suggest that a more promising strategy of
achieving a greater degree of coordination among regulators when global
financial institutions fail would be to frame the debate in terms of favoring the
particularly deserving uninsured small creditors of such an institution. The
interests and characteristics of this group, albeit inchoate, will be both more
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TABLES
Table 1. Organizational Structure of 16 Large Complex Financial Institutions
NUMBER OF
Bank Ins. Mutual Other Non- Total % of Countries
Subs Subs Funds Fin. Fin. Subs: Foreign
Financial and Subs Subs Subs:
Institution Name SPVs
Citigroup 101 35 706 584 1,009 2,435 50% 84
Deutsche Bank AG 54 9 458 526 907 1,954 77% 56
Bank of America 32 24 396 282 673 1,407 28% 29
HSBC 85 37 246 381 1,234 61% 47
BNP Paribas 88 74 102 433 1,170 61% 58
RBS 31 29 168 450 483 1,161 11% 16
Morgan Stanley 19 22 225 170 616 1,052 47% 46
BarclaysPlc 49 21 309 239 385 1,003 43% 73
Societe Generale 81 13 93 270 387 844 56% 60
JPMorgan Chase. 38 17 229 145 375 804 51% 36
ABN AMRO 50 7 129 204 280 670 63% 43
USBAG 29 2 121 66 199 417 96% 41
Goldman Sachs 7 4 48 151 161 371 51% 21
Credit Suisse 31 4 91 63 101 290 93% 31
Merrill Lynch 16 9 85 89 68 267 64% 25
Average 47 20 227 270 440 1005 57% 44
Max 101 74 706 584 1009 2435 96% 84
Min 7 2 48 63 68 267 11% 16
Lehman Brothers 9 3 84 210 127 433 45% 20
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Table 2: Global Time Zones
Vol. 31, 2014
New London +5 Frankfurt +6 Tokyo +13 Hong Kong
York hours hours hours + 13 hours)
9:30 to 08:00-16:30 09:00 -17:30 09:00 to 15:00 09:15 to 16:00
16:00 - lunch
(2.0 h (2.0 h (zero h (zero h
overlap) overlap) overlap) overlap)
24:00 05:00 06:00 13:00 13:00
01:00 06:00 07:00 14:00 14:00
02:00 07:00 08:00 15:00 15:00
03:00 08:00 09:00 16:00 16:00
04:00 09:00 10:00 17:00 17:00
05:00 10:00 11:00 18:00 18:00
06:00 11:00 12:00 19:00 19:00
07:00 12:00 13:00 20:00 20:00
08:00 13:00 14:00 21:00 21:00
09:00 14:00 15:00 22:00 22:00
09:30 15:00 15:30 22:30 22:30
10:00 15:30 16:00 23:00 23:00
11:00 16:00 17:00 24:00 24:00
11:30 16:30 17:30 24:30 24:30
12:00 17:00 18:00 01:00 01:00
(next day) (next day)
13:00 18:00 19:00 02:00 02:00
14:00 19:00 20:00 03:00 03:00
15:00 20:00 21:00 04:00 04:00
16:00 21:00 22:00 05:00 05:00
17:00 22:00 23:00 06:00 06:00
18:00 23:00 24:00 07:00 07:00
19:00 24:00 01:00 08:00 08:00
20:00 01:00 02:00 09:00 09:00
20:15 01:15 02:15 09:15 09:15
21:00 02:00 03:00 10:00 10:00
22:00 03:00 04:00 11:00 11:00
23:00 04:00 05:00 12:00 12:00
1 _(next day) (next day)
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Table 4
Legislation based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency has
been adopted in: the following countries:


















United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland IF_ I
British Virgin Islands 12003
Great Britain 2006
United States of America 2005
Source: UNCITRAL, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997)
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitraltexts/insolvency/1997Model.html (this
site contains a link to a list of adopting countries; accessed September 14, 2013).
734
Vol. 31, 2014
